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Abstract
In a number of recent articles migration has been used as a ‘natural experiment’, which
can give insights into the general mechanisms of attitude formation. Studies from the
field of psychology, however, suggest that the process of acculturation might be
affected by migrants being in a particular situation. If such a ‘migration effect’
exists, then the conclusions on the more general mechanisms of attitude formation
based on migration studies have to be rethought. We test this using a novel study
design comparing acculturation in which we compare attitudes in the Russian diaspora
left behind, in Estonia, Latvia and the Ukraine, by the collapse of the Soviet Union to
those of Russian migrants in Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. The results show
that there are no differences in acculturation between the diaspora in the East and the
migrants in the West and therefore no ‘migration effect’ on acculturation.
Keywords: Acculturation, Natural experiment, Migrants, Diaspora, Soviet union
Introduction
Large-scale cultural or institutional changes are rare. Though this is good for the
stability of society, it also means that it is difficult to test many of the existing
theories on how culture and institutions impact attitudes. Except for the few nat-
ural experiments, like the East-West German reunification (Svallfors, 2010), there
are few opportunities to study instances in which we can follow how attitudes
adapt to a new context or cultural changes. Partly for this reason the literature
on whether migrants’ attitudes acculturate has grown quite substantially over the
last several years as, in addition to giving insights into the integration of mi-
grants into new host societies, these studies also help to explore the more gen-
eral mechanisms of attitude formation. Studies of migrants’ attitudes have, in
some instances, even been described as ‘natural experiments’, as they show what
happens when a large group of people with varying backgrounds come into con-
tact with a new country having a different culture and different institutions.
Though the results of these studies are mixed, the majority do show that
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migrants acculturate, meaning that their attitudes become more like those held
by the native population than those dominant in the country of origin (Breidahl
& Larsen, 2016; Chauvet, Gubert, & Mesplé-Somps, 2016; Dinesen, 2012; Luttmer
& Singhal, 2008; Maxwell, 2010; Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2015; Röder &
Mühlau, 2012; Röder & Mühlau, 2014; Safi, 2010). This would indicate that
attitudes are context-specific and thus changeable.
There might, however, be an issue with this approach of testing the mechanisms
of attitude formation. A number of studies, mainly from the field of psychology,
have argued that the act of migrating might be affected the willingness to adapt to
the values and attitudes in a new country (Berry, Kim, Minde, & Mok, 1987; Berry,
1997, 2001; Birman & Trickett, 2001; Boneva & Frieze, 2001; Main, 2014; Polek,
Van Oudenhoven, & Berge, 2011). If this is the case, then conclusions about the
more general mechanisms of attitude formation might have to be reconsidered.
Therefore, we want to demonstrate whether the ‘migration effect’ on the ability to
acculturate exists.
There are, however, a number of problems related to comparing the impact of
the migration dimension on acculturation, as this often entails comparisons of cul-
turally very different groups. To overcome the problems in the literature we out-
line a novel design in which the collapse of the Soviet Union serves as a natural
experiment. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signalled the beginning of the end
for the Soviet Union, and about 2 years later the collapse was final. This meant,
among many other things, that the states in the union now became sovereign
nations again, which resulted in 25 million Russians becoming a ‘part of a large
diaspora, without moving an inch or leaving their homes’ (Heleniak, 2004). Large
communities of Russians therefore live in former Soviet states, and these diasporas make
up a sizeable part of the population in countries like Estonia (24.8%), Latvia (26.2%), and
Ukraine (17.3%) (CIA World Factbook, 2011). By comparing to what degree the attitudes
of ethnic Russian-living the aforementioned countries and Russian migrants living in
Western Europe are similar to those of the natives in their respective countries, we will
study whether this ‘migrant effect’ exists.
We will measure the level of acculturation to the attitudes of the natives by
combining the ‘European Social Survey’ (ESS) from 2008 with the ‘Migrants’
Welfare State Attitudes’ (MIFARE) survey from 2016, which was collected among
ten migrant groups, including Russians, in the Netherlands, Denmark and
Germany. Using this combination we will study attitudes of displaced Russians
concerning whether providing healthcare for the sick, a guaranteed standard of
living for the old and the unemployed, and resource redistribution should be the
responsibility of government.
A migration effect?
The effect of being a migrant can be broken down into two principal compo-
nents: migrating and being a minority. As we will argue below, we focus on the
first and hold the latter constant, which is also why we use the term ‘migration
effect’. We are, however, not the first to directly or indirectly consider these two
components of the migrant experience. Though a ‘migration effect’ has yet to be
suggested elsewhere, very similar ideas do exist in other studies. In the field of
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psychology, acculturation and the psychological problems related to it form a par-
ticular area of study. In a now seminal text, Berry et al. (1987) argued that the
degree to which different groups acculturate is affected by two factors: whether
the group migrated (i.e. mobility) and whether contact with the native population
is voluntary (i.e. voluntariness of contact). On these two dimensions, Berry et al.
(1987) examine five different groups – ethnic groups, native peoples, immigrants,
sojourners, and refugees – as outlined below (Table 1).
The four groups are placed into the table following the argument that while immi-
grants and refugees both migrated to a new country, the immigrants did this volun-
tarily and usually with the intention to stay, while refugees arrived in the host country
by forces outside their control. This creates a difference in voluntariness of contact
with natives: ‘Those who are voluntarily involved in the acculturation process (e.g.
immigrants) may experience less difficulty than those with little choice in the matter
(e.g. refugees and native peoples), since their attitudes towards contact and change
might be more positive’ (Berry et al., 1987, p. 494). Immigrants and sojourners, such
as expatriates and international students, both arrive in the host country voluntarily,
but sojourners arrive with the intention to stay for only a limited period. On the other
hand ethnic groups are born in the country, creating a difference in the mobility di-
mension. Ethnic groups and native people are both groups born in the ‘recipient’
country, and thus similar in the mobility dimension, but indigenous people differ
from ethnic minorities in that the host country was involuntarily imposed upon them,
for instance via colonisation, making a difference in the voluntariness of contact. The
result of this, Berry et al. (1987) theorise, is that the acculturation process will be the
easiest for ethnic groups and most difficult for refugees, with immigrants, sojourners
and native peoples falling somewhere in-between. The impact of the mobility dimen-
sion, that is, whether the group migrated or not, should therefore be biggest when
comparing migrants and native peoples.
Berry et al. (1987) tested the impact of the mobility dimension by comparing Korean
immigrants to ethnic groups of Anglo-Saxon origin in Canada. They argue that this is a
good test of the mobility dimension, as this ‘holds the society constant’ by only compar-
ing groups in Canada. While it could be argued that this does fix the context problem,
it has the problem of comparing culturally different groups. If the immigrants and eth-
nic groups are different in ways that controlling for socioeconomic status cannot cap-
ture, the difference could lead to a ‘false positive’ regarding a migration effect. Berry et
al.’s (1987) argument has been repeated often and serves as one of the seminal texts in
studies of acculturation, but the ideas underlying the experiment have rarely been
retested (see meta-review of the literature by Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2013). One of
the few exceptions is an article by Sodowsky, Lai, and Plake (1991) that examines how
the type of migration, in this case voluntary migration and the involuntary refugee sta-
tus, affects the acculturation of Hispanic Americans and Asian Americans. This article,
however, also has the issue of comparing culturally different groups and drawing
Table 1 The mobility and voluntariness of contact with natives of different groups
Voluntary contact Involuntary contact
Sedentary Ethnic groups Native Peoples
Migrant Immigrants & Sojourners Refugees
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conclusions on the differences. Furthermore migrants are not comparable with refugees
with respect to mental and health characteristics (see Lindert, von Ehrenstein, Priebe,
Mielck, & Brähler, 2009 for an overview), as well as on perceived acculturation stress in
general (Gil & Vega, 1996; Nwadiora & McAdoo, 1996).
The migration effect in other domains
Following Berry’s theory outlined above, we expect ethnic groups to have an easier
time acculturating than migrant groups. However, the opposite conclusion is
reached in other academic fields. Studies of educational success have pointed to
‘migrant optimism’ as the reason why the migrant groups tends to do better than
resident ethnic groups (this mainly refers to African Americans and Native
Americans). The argument goes that while immigrants tend to form a non-
oppositional relationship with the dominant culture, native peoples or ethnic
groups tend to form oppositional relationships with the dominant culture (Ogbu
& Simons, 1998). However, these studies suffer from the same problem as Berry’s
work, as the studies compare fundamentally different groups, mainly in the US
context (Hirschman, 2001; Kao & Tienda, 2005; Perreira, Harris, & Lee, 2006).
For instance, Kao and Tienda (2005) find that children of Asian American mi-
grants tend to do relatively better, and children of African Americans tend to do
worse than children of white Americans.
In finally, studies of migration and migration patterns have also argued for a
migrant personality (Boneva & Frieze, 2001; Polek et al., 2011). In this literature
it is argued that those who choose to migrate have specific personality traits such
as desire for achievement and power, and lower focus on affiliation and family,
which make them more likely to migrate and which therefore also could make
them more likely to acculturate (Boneva & Frieze, 2001; Polek et al., 2011).
Boneva and Frieze (2001) tested this by comparing personality traits of those who
say they are willing or unwilling to migrate. Though this design does hold the
cultural group and society consistent, it has the issue that the group that are
willing to migrate actually have not migrated yet. Polek et al. (2011) partially
solves this issue by comparing Poles who migrated to the Netherlands with Poles
who stayed behind. This does test the personalities of those of migrated and
those who did not, within the same cultural group. However, if we compare
against the theoretical setup of Berry et al. (1987), which to be fair was not the
purpose of the paper, it is problematic that the Poles who did not migrate are
not an ethnic group, but the native population in Poland.
Testing the migration effect
So to recapitulate we have two issues. First of the literature related to migrants
and ethnic groups acculturation gives us opposing expectations. The literature
following in the footsteps of Berry et al. (1987) finds that ethnic groups have an
easier time acculturating. On the other hand, the literature on ‘migrant optimism’
and the ‘migrant personality’ suggests the opposite that migrants tend to do bet-
ter in terms of acculturating. Secondly, the studies have a persistent issue of
comparing culturally different groups and then concluding on the differences.
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With these issues in mind, we suggest a better design to test the migration ef-
fect. We want to hold constant the country of origin and thereby avoid cross-
cultural comparisons that plagues the literature cited above, but still have variation
on the migration dimension. Ideally, this would require that we have a group ori-
ginating from the same country that are both a migrant group and an ethnic
group, living within the same country. This situation we simply cannot think up,
as there might situations in where groups from the same country have arrived for
different reasons. However, since we want to compare migrants to an ethnic group
the best approximation of the latter might be a situation where the previous coun-
try collapses and a new one arises, and as result of this a new ethnic minority
group is created. This would be what Berry et al. (1987) calls an ethnic group, but
in what is commonly known as a diaspora (Van Hear, 2014). If we can compare
members of the diaspora with migrants from the same country of origin, we can
compare the effect of migrating among the same origin group across different con-
ditions. The only issue with this is that we still have variation in the society of the
recipient country, but this we will try to account for as well as possible. The differ-
ent groups we are interested in are highlighted in Fig. 1 below.
Following the argument presented above we will study the impact the migration
dimension by focusing on two groups: Russian migrants in the three Western
countries Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany, and the Russian diaspora in
Ukraine, Estonia, and Latvia. This gives us the ability to distinguish among the at-
titudes of migrants, the diaspora, and compare these to the natives in the countries
being considered.
Ukraine, Estonia, and Latvia have a shared history of leaving the Soviet Union
and becoming sovereign nations at about the same time. Because of this, the
Fig. 1 Russian migrant populations in Western countries and select former Soviet states. Note: The Western
countries highlighted in red are Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. The countries highlighted in blue
are Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine
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countries all have a Russian diaspora of about the same size (17–26%). The process
of leaving the Soviet Union meant that the Russians living in these countries chan-
ged status from being part of the majority in the union to being the largest an eth-
nic minority in the three countries (CIA World Fact Book, 2011). This change was
not initiated by the Russians living in these countries and has led to tensions and
conflicts between the new ethnic group and the new majority (Heleniak, 2004;
Kolstø, 1996). For instance Kolstø (1996) argues that: “The collapse of the unitary
Soviet state has plunged its former citizens into a profound identity crisis. Particu-
larly hard hit are the twenty-five million Russians living in the non-Russian succes-
sor states.” (Kolstø, 1996, p. 609). The Russian diasporas in the three countries has
fought hard to maintain the memory and symbols of the former Soviet empire, but
are left feeling increasingly forgotten and marginalized (Aasland, 1994; Heleniak,
2006; Kesküla, 2015; Melchior & Visser, 2011).
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany, all have fairly large populations of
first generation migrants (10–12% in 2015, according to Eurostat) and a rea-
son history of receiving migrants from most of the world (Eurostat, 2015).
However, as opposed to in Ukraine, Estonia, and Latvia the Russian migrants
to not make up any of the five largest migrant populations in any of the three
countries. For these countries there is a potential issue of us not knowing the
reason for migrating. Particularly for Germany this might be an issue in
regards to the history with the East Block and the so-called ‘Aussiedler’, or
Ethnic Germans, from the former Soviet union who are entitled to German
citizenship due to their ethnic origin (Pfetsch, 1999). However, from the
survey data presented in the next section, we do know when our sample of
Russians in the West migrated. This was for 95% percent of them after 1989
thus not to escape the Soviet regime. From this we cannot conclude why they
migrated, but we can assume that this is mostly for non-humanitarian reasons.
However, to make sure any differences to not exist then analysis will do made
on a country basis also.
To sum up the argument we have two groups of Russians we aim to compare
in terms of acculturation. This leaves us with three possible outcomes: First, that
the diaspora acculturates more successfully than the migrants, as predicted by
the literature following Berry et al. (1987). Seconly, that the Russian migrants ac-
culturate better than the diaspora, as for instance predicted by the literature on
the ‘migrant optimism’. Third, that migrants and the diaspora acculturate to the
attitudes of the natives about equally well, which could shine a positive light on
the literature that uses migration as a ‘natural experiment’ that tests the mechan-
ism of attitude formation.
Data, variables and methods
The design of the article is based on comparing the Russian diaspora in former
Soviet countries with Russian migrants in other countries relative to native atti-
tudes towards the role of the government. As there is not one data set which
contains all these groups, we merged the Migrants’ Welfare State Attitudes sur-
vey (MIFARE) from 2016 (Bekhuis & Hedegaard, 2016) with the European Social
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Survey (ESS) from 2008. When using both datasets we will define and select Rus-
sians on the background of country of birth. There are other ways of defining na-
tionality like subjective nationality or citizenship (Hedegaard, 2017), but this one
allows us to compare across datasets.
The MIFARE survey was collected among ten migrant groups and natives in
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany. In both Denmark and the Netherlands,
the MIFARE sample from population registers is used. Because this was not pos-
sible in Germany, this sample is therefore based on strategically selected munici-
palities. This was only done in West Germany for two reasons. First, East
Germany has a completely different migration and integration history than West
Germany, which made it substantially more difficult to sample migrants from that
part of the country. Secondly, most other analysis shows that you therefore have
to treat Germany as essentially two countries, especially regarding questions of
support for the welfare state (for detailed information see Bekhuis & Hedegaard,
2016). The sample included migrants who were 16 years or older when they mi-
grated and who were at least 18 years old during the survey. The survey was col-
lected both online and offline, and in the mother tongue or in Danish, Dutch or
German. In total, 408 Russian migrants in Denmark filled out the survey (re-
sponse rate = 40.8%), 475 Russians did so in the Netherlands (response rate =
43.2%), and 308 Russians in Germany completed the questionnaire (response rate
= 14.5%). The net samples for the native Danes, Dutch, and Germans are 397
(44.1%), 427 (47.4%), and 233 (29.9%) respectively. For the Danish part of the
survey we were able to test non-response using the social register. For the Rus-
sians this showed a slight overrepresentation of the young, non-citizens and those
in the workforce, but generally the differences the response and non-response
groups were minimal (Bekhuis & Hedegaard, 2016).
The ESS is a high-quality survey based on face-to-face interviews collected every
2 years since 2002 among participating European countries. In the survey the
country of birth is registered, which means that it is possible to find the migrant
sub-populations. For this reason the ESS has served an important role, as it has
been the empirical component of much of the current literature on migrants’ atti-
tudes and acculturation (e.g. Breidahl & Larsen, 2016; Dinesen & Hooghe, 2010b;
Maxwell, 2010; Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2015; Röder & Mühlau, 2014; Safi,
2010). In this article we will rely on the 2008 version of the ESS, as this survey in-
cluded a special module on attitudes to the welfare state and the role of the gov-
ernment in it. Using this survey we could pinpoint Russians living Estonia (N =
224), Latvia (N = 153), and Ukraine (N = 132) and the natives from these countries
(N = 6942). The percentages of Russians living in the three Western countries are
higher than the percentages of Russians in Estonia, Latvia and Ukraine in the ESS,
which is possibly due to the fact that ESS is not a migrant survey and therefore is
not translated. This underrepresentation of Russians in the in the former Soviet
countries can therefore underestimate the effect as it might rule out the least inte-
grated Russians who do not speak the language. The recognition that the ESS has
a large population of Russians in the former Soviet countries registered as migrants
is not new (Dinesen, 2013). This article is, however, the first to attempt to make
positive use of it.
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Dependent variables
Acculturation of values and attitudes can be and has been measured in a number
of areas, including social trust (Dinesen & Hooghe, 2010a), gender values (Breidahl
& Larsen, 2016), and support for the welfare state (Luttmer, 2001; Reeskens & Van
Oorschot, 2015). For the two survey the only possibly overlap in questions is on
whether it should be the government’s responsibility to provide welfare in four
areas: ensuring adequate healthcare for the sick, ensuring a reasonable standard of
living for the old, ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed and
reducing income differences between rich and poor. For the first three dependent
variables the questions were similar in the ESS and MIFARE surveys; however, the
answer categories differ. Regarding the questions on the sick, old and unemployed,
respondents were asked to answer on an 11-point scale from 0 to 10 in the ESS,
while in the MIFARE respondents had to answer on a four point scale from 1 to 4
where 1 means no government response at all and 4 complete government respon-
sibility. In merging these questions, the ESS categories were adjusted to the
MIFARE scale. Categories 0 to 2 in the ESS were coded as 1, 3 to 5 as 2, 6 to 8
as 3, and 9 and 10 as 4. Since there is no way to divide the categories evenly we
chose a ‘conservative’ recoding, in that we have fewer respondents going into the
top, ‘complete government responsibility’ (4) category.1 The questions about redu-
cing income difference could be answered in the ESS on a five-point scale with a
middle category. As there was no way to fit this middle category into the four-
point scale of the MIFARE data we did not include this answer category.2 A final
point to notice on this variable is that while MIFARE asked about reducing income
differences between rich and poor, the ESS did not include this phrasing. As a re-
sult we ended up with four dependent variables where the respondents answered
those different tasks ‘definitely should not be’, ‘probably should not be’, ‘probably
should be’ or ‘definitely should be’ a government responsibility. For this and all
other variables, ‘don’t know’ and invalid answers were not included. Mean scores
by country are presented in Table 3 in Appendix.
Independent variables
To account for compositional differences, a number of variables are included in the
analyses. We included age in groups that represent the history of the Soviet Union. The
youngest group are those 24 years old or younger, who were socialised after the fall of
the Soviet Union. Next are those 25 to 39 years old, who were children at the time of
the Soviet Union. The third group are those 40 to 55 years old, who were fully socia-
lised during the rule of the Soviet Union. Finally, those 56 years or older were also
socialised during Soviet times and form the oldest age group. Gender is measured by a
dummy variable, indicating if a respondent is a female or not. Religiosity is measured
on a four-point scale ranging from ‘not religious at all’ (1) to ‘very religious’ (4). This
variable can be included as a linear variable. Respondents’ education level is measured
using the internationally comparable ISCED scale ranging from 0, no formal education,
to 6, upper level tertiary. Social trust is measured using the standard question of ‘gener-
ally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too
careful in dealing with people?’ Higher scores on the merged scale from 1 to 5 reflect
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more trust in other people. Respondents’ net household income is measured using dif-
ferent categories in the different countries in the ESS and in the MIFARE. In order to
compare the different income categories between countries and surveys we used quar-
tiles of the different income scales. The quartiles are calculated on a national level. In
order to show the differences on the migration dimension we included a dummy on
whether or not a respondent is a member of the diaspora. Respondents in Estonia,
Latvia and Ukraine are counted as part of the diaspora, whereas respondents in
Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands are counted as migrants.
Methods
The analyses were done in two steps. First, the means of the four different dependent
variables were shown by group. T-tests were used to show significant differences be-
tween those groups. The means by age group were also presented to show whether or
not differences are caused by age or generation effects.
Second, fixed effects regression analyses on the four different dependent variables
were made. The data has a multilevel structure as respondents are nested in countries.
This number of nesting groups is too low to meet the assumptions for multilevel ana-
lyses (Hox, 2010). However, to still reckon with the multilevel structure, we make fixed
effects models, which account for clustering on a country level, but do not add any
macro level variables to explain this clustering. In the regression models only the atti-
tudes of the Russians abroad were included. To show whether or not the attitudes of
the Russian left-behinds and Russian migrants were affected by native populations, the
mean attitude of the natives in a country was included in the analyses. A significant in-
fluence, or the lack thereof, from the variable diaspora tells if the diaspora and the mi-
grants differ significantly from each other or not. A positive figure means that diaspora
Russians are more in favour of government responsibility than migrant Russians, where
a negative figure means the opposite.
Results
We start by showing the different attitudes of diaspora of Russians living in Estonia,
Latvia and Ukraine (headlined as diaspora), Russian migrants living in Denmark, the
Netherlands and Germany (migrants), natives from Estonia, Latvia and Ukraine (natives
East), and natives from Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany (natives West). In
Fig. 2 the mean score on attitudes towards government responsibility is presented. To
iterate, the questions about government responsibility are on a four-point scale, from
‘definitely should not be’ (1) to ‘definitely should be’ (4).
Figure 2 shows an overall tendency for the migrants and the diaspora to be more in
favour in government responsibility than the natives, but also more in agreement with
their respective paring of natives in the East and the West. Examining the support for
the government providing a reasonable standard of living for the sick, the diaspora
(3.81) and migrants (3.80) express slightly more support for this than the natives in the
Baltics (3.71) and Western countries (3.75). However, considering that the question
runs on a scale from 1 to 4 these differences between the groups are very small and in
most cases insignificant (not shown).
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Regarding government’s responsibility to provide a standard of living for the old,
we see that the diaspora (3.86) has the strongest preference for more responsibility.
This is followed by the migrants (3.77) and natives in the East (3.72) and the West
(3.63). There is thus a sort of paring where the migrants and the natives in both
the East and the West are more internally alike than different. The same overall
pattern is observed in regards to attitudes government responsibility for providing
a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed. There we again see that both
the diaspora (3.51) and migrants (3.28) favour a larger role for government than
do the respective natives (3.32 and 3.15). Finally, regarding the role of the govern-
ment in redistribution, attitudes are quite divergent between the diaspora (3.37)
and migrants (2.87), with the diaspora preferring significantly more government re-
sponsibility in this area. This, however, seems to follow the differences between na-
tives East (3.30) and West (2.93).
Overall, Fig. 2 shows that the diaspora and migrants would prefer government
to take more responsibility for providing welfare in these four areas than natives
in the East and West do. However, we again see that the diaspora are more simi-
lar to the natives in the East than those in the West and the same is true for
the migrants in the West. Next, we will present a regression analysis to test
whether this pattern also holds when accounting for compositional and context-
ual factors.
Table 2 shows the results of fixed effects regression analyses. In this model, only
Russians in the Baltic countries, Ukraine and the Western countries are included. Since
acculturation is measured in comparison to natives, the natives’ attitudes are included
as an aggregated country mean. This variable, together with a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether someone belongs to a diaspora or is a migrant, enables us to test whether
or not diaspora residents and migrants differ from each other, and whether the atti-
tudes are affected by attitudes of the natives.
The diaspora variable shows the effect of being a part of the diaspora as opposed to
being a migrant. A significant effect on the diaspora variable would mean that the Rus-
sian diaspora in the Ukraine and the two Baltic countries are different in attitude from
Fig. 2 Mean of dependent variables by group
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Russian migrants in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. A negative effect means
that diaspora are less in favour of government responsibility than migrants, and a posi-
tive sign means the opposite. It appears that there are no significant differences be-
tween diaspora and migrants on all the four attitudes, meaning that after controlling
for compositional characteristics, there is no difference between the diaspora and mi-
grants in how they adjust to the receiving society. The idea that those who migrate vol-
untarily have a mind-set or personality which should result in quicker acculturation to
the host society, in other words the ‘migrant effect’, cannot be confirmed.
Looking at the other effects in Table 2, we can see that natives’ attitude has a positive ef-
fect on the attitude towards government responsibility for the old, the unemployed, and re-
distribution. This shows that natives’ attitudes affect the attitudes of the Russian diaspora
and migrants, except towards responsibility for the sick. Regarding age, it appears that the
youngest are in favour of less government responsibility for the old, the unemployed, and
redistribution, similar to what was reported in Fig. 2 above. The pattern is, however, not as
clear-cut as above, possibly because including other composition effects captures some of
the differences between the age groups. Religiosity only has a significant effect on attitudes
towards redistribution. The effect here is positive, meaning that the more religious someone
Table 2 Fixed effects regression models on attitudes to government responsibility. Coefficients
and significance levels reported
Standard of living
for the sick
Standard of living
for the old
Standard of living for
the unemployed
Redistribution between
rich and poor
Diaspora (versus
migrants)
−0.0288 −0.0969 − 0.0712 0.215
Natives 0.229 0.406* 0.560*** 0.445**
Age (ref = > 56) ref ref ref ref
55–40 −0.0674 −0.0955** − 0.0776 − 0.124
39–25 −0.126** − 0.0752 −0.210** − 0.171
< 25 − 0.0781 −0.165** − 0.458*** −0.207
Age (ref = > 56) 0.0457 0.0386 0.0616 0.00658
Religiosity (1–4) 0.0191 0.0265 0.0332 0.0822*
Income (ref = 1st
quartile)
ref ref ref ref
2nd quartile −0.00386 −0.0243 −0.0999 − 0.0785
3rd quartile −0.0937** − 0.0620 −0.236*** − 0.160*
4th quartile −0.0682 − 0.0854* −0.308*** − 0.415***
Education
(ref = ISCED 0)
ref ref ref ref
ISCED 1 0.118 0.113 0.298* 0.0802
ISCED 2 0.0673 0.0932 0.0541 0.152
ISCED 3 0.0814 0.0836 0.154 −0.117
ISCED 4 0.0807 0.167* 0.157 −0.0694
ISCED 5 0.0143 0.0628 0.0348 −0.119
ISCED 6 0.0455 0.0820 −0.0674 −0.0665
Social trust (1–5) 0,00117 0,0000482 0,0482** 0,0239
Constant 2.789*** 2.387*** 1.500** 1.345*
N 1401 1397 1374 1285
Note: Note: Based on merging ESS and MIFARE data
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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is, the more he or she thinks that the government is responsible for income redistribution
(Kahl, 2005). Income does not affect opinion about role of the government in providing for
the old, but affects the other three attitudes. Here the pattern is, not surprisingly, that those
who belong to the higher income quantiles see a smaller role for the government. This is in
line with classic class-based arguments regarding the role of the welfare state in society
(Svallfors, Kulin, & Schnabel, 2012). Education level has no effect at all.
Finally, it can be argued that length of stay in the country may have an effect. Russian
migrants in the Western European countries have stayed, on average, in the countries
for 11 years, while the majority of the Russian diaspora in Eastern Europe have been
there for more than 20 years. Length of stay could not be included in the models as it
creates multicollinearity with the age variable, as the older also have stayed longer. To
account for this we ran two additional models with only migrants and diaspora who
have been in the country for at least 10 years and at least 20 years (not shown). The
additional models show the same non-effects, which again leads to the conclusion that
we cannot demonstrate the ‘migration effect’.
Implications and limitations
A number of studies that have come out in recent years focus on migrants’ attitudes
and whether migrants acculturate, meaning whether they adapt to become more like
the natives. The studies predominantly show that migrants’ attitudes are context-
specific and therefore adaptable (Breidahl & Larsen, 2016; Luttmer & Singhal, 2008;
Maxwell, 2010; Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2015; Röder & Mühlau, 2014; Safi, 2010). In
addition to informing the debate on integration of migrants, these studies have also
been used to explore the general mechanisms of attitude formation, as migration is
seen as a ‘natural experiment’ in which we can observe whether changing context can
also change attitudes. Drawing on theories, mainly from psychology, we argue that this
praxis of using migration to test the mechanisms of attitude formation might be prob-
lematic if being a migrant alone has an impact on acculturation.
To explore this we outline a study design relying on a true natural experiment: the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union. This historic event resulted in a diaspora of upwards of 25 mil-
lion people ‘left behind’ in countries that used to belong to the union. The Russian
diaspora became a minority in the new countries involuntarily. By comparing their accul-
turation to that of Russians who migrated voluntarily, we are the first to test the ‘migra-
tion effect’. Compared to the existing literature, this design has the advantage that we can
pinpoint the effect of migrating, while keeping the effect of origin country and culture
constant. Based on the literature we outlined three possible scenarios: First, that the dias-
pora acculturates more successfully than the migrants, as predicted by the literature fol-
lowing Berry et al. (1987). Secondly, that the Russian migrants acculturate better than the
diaspora, as for instance predicted by the literature on the ‘migrant optimism’. Third, that
migrants and the diaspora acculturate to the attitudes of the natives about equally well. If
we did not find the latter scenario to be the most realistic then current research on the
adaptation of attitude formation to a new context might have overestimated, or underesti-
mated, the effect of context and institutions.
To test this we merged the fourth version of the European Social Survey with the Mi-
grants’ Welfare State Attitudes survey. By combining the two surveys we were able to
compare diaspora Russians in Estonia, Latvia and Ukraine, and Russian migrants in
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Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany, with each other and with natives in the respect-
ive countries. The results showed that the Russian diaspora in the two Baltic countries
and Ukraine did in fact prefer a more extensive responsibility for the government in pro-
viding welfare, which could be interpreted as initial support for the migration effect. How-
ever, the results also show that this difference is mainly due to the diaspora on average
being older and poorer. Therefore, when controlling for these factors, there was no differ-
ence in acculturation to natives’ attitudes between migrants and the diaspora.
Although we argue that the ‘migrant effect’ did not exist, there are some limitations
on the research design which should be improved before stating that a migrant person-
ality, regardless of context and country of origin, does not exist. The perfect design
would require the migrants and diaspora to be within the same context. It is, however,
hard to imagine a situation in the real world where this could be the case. With that in
mind, it is a limitation that we might not capture all contextual differences in the study.
Second, we only explore this using Russians as the case. We see no reason why
Russians should be more or less likely than other nationalities to acculturate, but more
variation in nationality would of course strengthen the conclusion. Third, the Russian
diaspora is quite homogeneous in terms of factors like age, income, and education. It
would have been good to have more variation to test the impact of these factors; how-
ever, given the nature of the experiment this was not possible. Finally, there is the ever-
present question of self-selection. According to Heleniak (2004), there has always been
a steady flow of migration between Russia and the bordering countries. However, from
the 1930s onwards, policies were implemented that facilitated increased migration from
Russia to the other states in the union. This resulted in an increased net migration es-
pecially to urban areas, in which the Russians could form communities. Though the
initial migration was voluntary, it cannot be ruled out that the decision to migrate be-
fore the fall of the Soviet Union and not to return after, which 2.1 million Russians did,
does signify some level of self-selection. Of the migrants we looked at in Western
Europe, less than 1% migrated before the fall of the union. Therefore, though we don’t
know specific reasons for migrating, we can presume that the action was voluntary and
not a flight from Soviet rule. However, as with those who initially migrated to the
Eastern countries but from the opposite point of view, it is impossible to know whether
there is an element of self-perceived compulsion.
Despite these limitations, we believe that this study is the best possible test of the
‘migrant effect’. For the growing field of migration studies this means that migration
can be used to study attitude formation in a more general sense. Migrant surveys show
not only attitudes of a select group of people from a certain origin country, but the atti-
tudes of people from a certain origin country who are adapting to their new environ-
ment. The question for further research is how fast will this process of acculturation of
attitudes go, and which factors affect the speed of the acculturation process.
Endnotes
1We have also run the model using a version where the lowest category was made
the smallest, but this did not substantially change the results.
2We have run the model also with the middle category included onetime in the nega-
tive and onetime in the more positive direction. As expected due to the bigger numbers
the effect sizes became larger, but did not result in different conclusions.
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics on the variables used for analysis
Diaspora Migrants
Respondents’ attitudes
Standard of living for the sick (mean 1–4) 3.81 3.80
Standard of living for the old (mean 1–4) 3.85 3.78
Standard of living for the unemployed (mean 1–4) 3.49 3.28
Redistribution between rich and poor (mean 1–4) 3.39 2.89
Age
> 56 79.9% 13.1%
55–40 15.9% 36.1%
39–25 3.9% 39.3%
< 25 0.2% 11.4%
Gender
Male 25.4% 32.2%
Female 74.6% 67.8%
Religiosity (mean 1–4) 2.61 1.99
Income in quartiles (mean 1–4) 2.12 2.28
Education
ISCED 0 8.0% 1.6%
ISCED 1 18.0% 0.2%
ISCED 2 14.5% 2.4%
ISCED 3 17.1% 16.9%
ISCED 4 18.5% 9.2%
ISCED 5 8.1% 67.5%
ISCED 6 15.5% 2.2%
Social trust (mean 1–5) 2.92 2.97
Natives’ attitudes
Standard of living for the sick (mean 1–4) 3.67 3.75
Standard of living for the old (mean 1–4) 3.68 3.62
Standard of living for the unemployed (mean 1–4) 3.26 3.15
Redistribution between rich and poor (mean 1–4) 3.25 2.94
N total 432 984
Note: Based on merging ESS and MIFARE data
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